necessary condition for a viable principle of freedom of speech. But unless there are free-speech-relevant attributes that are possessed by speech but not by action, the distinction between speech and action, at least as a matter of free speech theory, cannot do the work that appears to be required of it.
Although some kind of free-speech-relevant distinction between speech and action is thus a necessary condition for a meaningful free speech principle, it is by no means clear that such a distinction can be maintained. There is, to be sure, a difference between an actual fire and shouting fire in a crowded theater, 4 just as there is a difference among a pipe, a picture of a pipe, and a verbal description of a pipe. 5 In some contexts, distinctions between words and things and between speech and action plainly exist. But the existence of such a distinction in some contexts does not entail the conclusion that the everyday distinction between speech and action will mark anything of free speech significance, nor that the distinction can carry the weight that any meaningful principle of free speech must demand of it.
Controversies over the existence (or not) of a distinction between speech and action have occasionally appeared as weapons in contemporary debates about hate speech and pornography, with proponents of regulation questioning the distinction 6 and opponents accusing their adversaries of failing to grasp a self-standing contribution usable or not on its own terms, does not touch the basic analytic point about the structure of a free speech principle. Although the most obvious application of the distinction set out in the previous paragraph is with respect to a differential immunity from restriction for speech and non-speech behavior causing equivalent harm or other negative consequences, the distinction between speech and non-speech behavior, as articulated in the text, could also arise in the context of positive rather than negative consequences. See Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, supra, at 204. For example, if there were an affirmative obligation on the part of government to subsidize speech-relevant activities, a free speech principle would generate a greater obligation to subsidize or otherwise support speech than to subsidize or support non-speech activities bringing equivalent benefits. What is key is the differential, and not whether the differential attaches to the restrictive as opposed to the supportive activities of the agent against whom the free speech claim is offered. See Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech as a Special Right (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
4 Cf Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic."). 7 Yet these debates have taken place in such a narrow (and too often tendentious) context that they have avoided confronting the most important foundational issues about freedom of speech. In fact, it is not uncommon for the defenders of a speech-action distinction to take the existence of a free speech principle as a given and thus as the premise for the necessity of accepting the distinction. 8 As a matter of positive law or political rhetoric such a strategy may well be defensible, but for engaging in a deeper exploration of the foundations of the very idea of free speech it is plainly unacceptable. In some contexts examining with an open mind whether a free speech principle is itself sound is an important task, 9 and for that task we cannot simply assume the conclusion of the inquiry. Rather, when we inquire HATE SPEECH: RETHINKING REGULATION AND RESPONSES 306, 308 10 (Michael Herz & Peter Molnar eds., 2012) (same). Stanley Fish also questions the distinction, but, given his skeptical stance about the ontology of distinctions in general, it is difficult to know what to make of his claims about the distinction between speech and action. STANLEY FISH, THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT'S A GOOD THING, TOO 106 (1994) (noting the "general difficulty of separating speech from action").
7 See, e.g THEORY 203, 204 & n.7 (2001) (assuming that there is a "constitutionally significant difference between speech and .. action'); Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Speech Clause and the Limits of Neutrality, 51 ALB. L. REV. 19, 23 (1986) (noting that much of First Amendment doctrine is "predicated on the speech/action distinction").
9 Such contexts would include not only philosophical inquiry for its own sake, but also institutional and constitutional design in domains in which free speech principles are not yet accepted. One example would be countries with rudimentary free speech protection, and as to which foundational questions might thus be asked about how much free speech, if any, should be permitted. Another would be non-governmental settings (corporations and private colleges and universities, for example) in which free speech is considered in the context of institutional design decisions about who should be allowed or encouraged to say what, even apart from questions of positive law. And of course the groundings of the idea of free speech are plainly relevant to questions arising in the interpretation of the First Amendment itself, as is apparent both from the fact that much of existing free speech theory has been developed in the context of the First Amendment and from the frequency with which the Supreme Court makes reference to foundational principles in deciding First Amendment cases. E.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2547 50 (2012) (relying on the foundational premise that truth is not to be authoritatively determined by government); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 26 (1971) into whether there can be a sound free speech principle at all, we must subject to critical analysis just what it means to draw a distinction between speech and action, whether the distinction can actually be drawn, and whether the distinction, even if it can be drawn, can provide the basis for a principle of freedom of speech.
Thus, unburdened by any assumptions from existing positive law or political history-including but not limited to the law and history of the First Amendment-I examine here whether the kind of distinction between speech and action that is necessary to any principle of free speech can in fact be sustained. Much of the focus will be on issues of autonomy and freedom of thought, and even more particularly on arguments grounded in respect for the decision-making capacities of autonomous agents whose volitional decisions are often thought to be a necessary mediating step between speech and harmful action. But my goal is broader than that, for in questioning the viability of a speech-action distinction in this context I hope to raise questions about the speech-action distinction in other free speech contexts as well, and thus ultimately about the deep soundness of any free speech principle at all.
I. ON THE STRUCTURE OF A FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLE
Although my inquiry is pre-constitutional and pre-doctrinal, the structure of American constitutional doctrine illuminates the basic idea and the principal problem. And according to that doctrine, government regulation of most of the vast universe of human behavior need only satisfy the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test. 10 We can call this the "baseline rule," in the sense of it being the default standard applicable to all governmental action. In practice, the American baseline rule is a test of virtually no stringency," although one can 10 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 32 (1963) (holding that the wisdom of a law restricting the practice of debt adjustment to lawyers was for the legislature and not for the courts to decide);
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 90 (1955) (upholding on rational basis grounds the requirement that opticians could not fit eyeglasses without receiving a prescription from an optometrist or ophthalmologist); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391, 398 (1937) (holding that regulation for purposes of health, safety, morals, and welfare satisfied requirements of due process as long as it bore a "reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and [was] neither arbitrary nor discriminatory" (quoting Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934))); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (applying reasonableness test to regulation of business); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 53 (1938) (announcing that "rational basis" is the standard to be employed in evaluating the constitutionality of social and economic regulation).
11 See also N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 594 (1979) (concluding that courts applying rationality review should not interfere with policy decisions "[n]o matter how unwise" they may be); John F.
imagine tests more stringent than the existing rational basis test that would still operate in this baseline fashion.
12 But under the baseline rule that actually exists, the government may, as long as it meets extremely minimal standards of rationality, regulate most aspects of personal 3 or business 4 behavior. And thus, continuing to adhere to the preliminary terminology noted above, we can say that existing doctrine establishes that the government may regulate action subject only to the negligible scrutiny of the rational basis standard.
When the state seeks to regulate speech, however, it must show something more. We might characterize this "something more" as a "compelling interest,' 15 or instead employ a different formulation of the exceptionally heavy burden on the state to justify its regulation, 16 but the basic idea of (describing rationality review as "very forgiving"); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 , 1713 (1984 444, 447 (1969) (holding that advocacy of illegal action may be prohibited if it is directed to producing inuminent lawless action and is likely to produce that result). Brandenburg uses the standards of imminence and likelihood to embody its stringent protection of speech, but Brandenburg's implicit assumption is that, when dealing with non-speech behavior, the state may address problems that are neither "imminent" nor even requiring much more of a showing of necessity than is required by the rational basis standard is the same. Indeed, even when the heightened burden of justification embodies a degree of scrutiny less stringent than the compelling interest test, as for example with the so-called intermediate scrutiny applied to commercial speech, 17 the basic structure remains the same, for the fact that the object of regulation 18 is "speech," again to put it loosely and preliminarily, is what causes the regulation to be measured against a standard at least somewhat more stringent than that of mere rationality. 1 9 For present purposes the size of the gap between rational basis scrutiny of "action" and heightened scrutiny of "speech" can be set aside, but the very idea of there being a right to free speech presupposes at least some gap. Without the gap between free speech scrutiny and the scrutiny of some larger or other category, free speech would be merely an instance of some larger category, and it would be a conceptual error to think that there was a right to free speech in any meaningful sense.
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Implicit in the foregoing analysis and conclusion is a conception of rights as entities or principles that raise the standard of justification for restriction of the activities covered by the right above what it would otherwise be under some baseline standard of justification. For example, in the United States the justification for regulating the activity of operating a pushcart need only satisfy the rational basis baseline standard. 22 According to the conception of rights offered here, therefore, we can say that there is no constitutional right to operate a pushcart. 23 But if the justification for regulating pushcarts were required to be different from and higher than the standard for regulating everything else, we could then conclude that there was a right to operate a pushcart. And so too with speech. Because the standard for regulating speech, unlike the standard for regulating pushcarts, is indeed higher than the baseline now associated with rational basis scrutiny, there exists a constitutional right to speak in a way that there is not, as a matter of existing constitutional doctrine, a right to operate a pushcart.
24
The structure of American constitutional doctrine can thus illuminate this conception of just what it is for a right to exist, but this conception of rights is by no means limited to the United States, or even to the rights created by positive law at all. Consequently, even outside the domain of American constitutional law, the structure of the putative right to freedom of speech is the same. As a pre-constitutional or extra-constitutional question of moral or political philosophy, for example, the idea of a right to free speech-or a free speech principle-similarly rests on the existence of a difference between what happens when the right or principle applies and when it does not. Indeed, even if, contra Ronald Dworkin, 25 there is a general right to liberty, 26 it is still the case that when we speak of other and more specific rights and liberties we are not simply listing the instantiations of the general right. Rather, when we refer to a right to free speech we are designating something structurally different from, and stronger than, the myriad forms of behavior that would be subsumed by a right to liberty simpliciter. And because that differential strength manifests itself primarily in the way in which the right to free speech encompasses behavior whose arguable negative consequences would otherwise justify intervention or restriction even under a general right to liberty, 27 the 
II. A FALSE START WITH A REVEALING PREMISE
Among the first attempts to grapple with the distinction between speech and action was one that was also, and notoriously so, among the least successful. In Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 28 and then in The System of Freedom of Expression, 29 Thomas Emerson attempted to work out a system of absolute but bounded speech-a principle of free speech structured such that it covered only a small portion of the universe of communicative or expressive activity but which granted absolute protection to that which it covered.
30 Although everything that counted as "expression" should be absolutely protected, Emerson argued, the protection of the First Amendment should not be understood to extend to those acts, some of which happen to be verbal or linguistic or even communicative, which were not expression but instead were to be considered "action" or "conduct." 31 Accordingly, insisted Emerson, and paralleling Justice Douglas's idea that "speech brigaded with action" was not covered by Douglas's conception of an among others, were "action" and not "conduct," thus being entitled to no protection under the First Amendment, whereas most forms of advocacy, 38 most varieties of protest, 39 and all literature, 40 for example, were primarily "expression" and thus entitled to full (absolute) protection.
As was quickly obvious to his critics, 41 Emerson's distinction was question-begging in the extreme. Rather than employing some sort of distinction between the properties of expression and the properties of action as an analytic device to determine which behaviors were encompassed by the First Amendment and which were not, Emerson drew the distinction between expression and action on grounds that appeared, at best, obscure, and then proceeded to apply the label "expression" to those behaviors he found protected 42 and the labels "action" or "conduct" to those he found unprotected, all the while saying little about the actual factors that would distinguish the one from the other.
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J., dissenting) ("Speech is closely brigaded with action when it triggers a fight, as shouting 'fire' in a crowded theater triggers a not." (citation omitted)). Although Emerson's distinction was thus employed more to label outcomes than to generate orjustify them, it was nevertheless premised on the sound idea that the First Amendment could make sense only if there were some distinction between speech and action, and only if that distinction related in a meaningful way to the point of the First Amendment. 44 And thus if we examine Emerson's own views about the point of what he called the distinction between expression and conduct, we observe two things. First, and of lesser importance to the analysis here, is Emerson's catalog of positive justifications for a principle of freedom of expression, a catalog that included the conventional appeals to the search for truth, to the role of discourse in democratic governance, and to the virtues of individual self-expression, 45 as well as to the less conventional (at the time) idea that various political, sociological, and psychological factors, what Emerson called the "dynamics" of the limitation, 46 made speech especially vulnerable to restriction. Second, and more importantly, Emerson appeared to recognize that the positive values of searching for truth, facilitating democratic governance, and fostering self-expression could also be served by non-expressive (as Emerson understood it) conduct. 47 Moreover, Emerson might even be charitably interpreted to have acknowledged that even the regulation of conduct might be plagued by the same pathologies that affected the regulation of expression. 48 As a result, he understood that it was both difficult yet necessary to offer a distinction between expression and conduct, a distinction implicit in the idea of freedom of speech and thus in the First Amendment itself
To meet this challenge, Emerson relied on the conclusion that "expression is normally conceived as doing less injury to other social goals than action. It generally has less immediate consequences, is less irremediable in its impact." 49 To oversimplify, Emerson constructed much of his view about the importance of the distinction between expression (speech) and conduct (action) 64 STAN. L. REv. 851, 854, 859, 861-62, 896, 900 (2012) (demonstrating experimentally that the phenomenon of motivated reasoning influences subjects' determination whether an act is speech or conduct).
44 See SCHAUER, supra note 3, at 3 14; Schauer, supra note 21. 45 Emerson, supra note 28, at 878 79. 46 EMERSON, supra note 29, at 9 11; Emerson, supra note 28, at 887 93.
47 Thus, Emerson acknowledged that the distinction between expression and action may not always be "clear," may at times be "obscure," and may seem at times "artificial." EMERSON, supra note 29, at 18. 48 Id. 49 EMERSON, supra note 29, at 9.
[Vol. 65:427on the premise that expression, compared to conduct, was normally more selfregarding 50 and therefore less harmful.
Emerson's reliance on what is "normally" the case makes clear that it is unfair to accuse him of making the implausible claim that speech is always or necessarily more self-regarding than action. Rather, Emerson argued that on average, or in the aggregate, the category of speech, qua category, was less other-regarding than the category of action, 52 and accordingly that the category of speech could be differentially protected relative to the category of action, even assuming equal positive benefits from the two categories, with less detrimental effect on society's ability to deal with the negative consequences caused by both speech and action. By assuming that the category of speech is less harmful than the category of action, 53 Emerson could argue that protecting speech but not action would have only minimal effect on the state's ability to regulate harmful activities.
Not only did Emerson acknowledge that these relative determinations of other-regardingness or harm-producing capacities were based on the tendencies of categories rather than truths about every case, but he also made clear that in shifting from the term "speech" to that of "expression" he was not advocating that the principle of freedom of speech could or should be expanded to include the full range of behavior that might be considered self-50 The philosophers' traditional distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding acts is not congruent with the distinction between harmless and harmful acts, because an act can be other-regarding and beneficial, and an act can be self-regarding and harmful to the actor. See Jovan Babi6, Self-Regarding/OtherRegarding Acts: Some Remarks, 5 PROLEGOMENA 193, 198 200 (2006) ; C.L. Ten, Mill on Self-Regarding Actions, 43 PHW. 29, 31 32, 34, 37 (1968 expressive. 54 Rather, Emerson's terminological shift was designed to make clear that the freedom of speech encompassed forms of communicative behavior that would not count as "speech" according to the ordinary language meaning of that term-flag burning (or flag waving), painting, sculpture, music, armband-wearing, uniform-wearing, picketing, and parading, for example, to say nothing of writing and printing-and also to emphasize that there were forms of language-"speech" in the ordinary language sense-that did not fall under his heading of expression. Behind Emerson's distinction was the belief that some forms of human communication operate in a way that is more reflective than reflexive, as when I actually think about your argument rather than when I unthinkingly react to your surprising me by shouting "Boo!" For Emerson, the difference between the reflective and the reflexive was the keystone of distinguishing speech from action, and thus the foundation for the differential protection of speech that lies at the heart of the First Amendment.
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Emerson's ultimately question-begging approach nonetheless contained two important (although not necessarily sound) ideas. First, the category of
speech is better understood as the category of communication. Thus, what we may at times understand as a distinction between speech and action is better conceived as a distinction between communicative and non-communicative conduct. 57 And, second, the category of communication, according to Emerson, is, as a category, less likely to produce negative consequences than the category of non-communicative conduct.
58 It is these two ideas-that communication as a category is different from non-communicative conduct in a free-speech-relevant way, and that communication as a category is less harmful than non-communicative conduct-to which we must now turn. Emerson's terminological shift from "speech" to "expression" reveals his belief that the distinction between communication and action arises out of a fundamental and natural distinction between thinking and doing. For Emerson, there is an important distinction between thinking or contemplating or reflecting on something, on the one hand, and actually taking an action, on the other. But is the distinction sound, and, even if it is, what does it say, if anything, about the idea of freedom of speech?
The place to start in examining the question is with the seemingly straightforward difference between a person's contemplation of engaging in some action and her actually engaging in it, with free speech protecting only the former and not the latter. Thus, what might make communication relevantly different from conduct, different in a way that connects with the First Amendment's ideas and ideals, is the way in which communication about some action-whether it is to describe, commend, or condemn it-is conceptually distinct from the action itself If I urge you to shoot someone, that act is different from my shooting someone, and it is different from you shooting someone. And what might make this undeniable conceptual separation important is not only the possibility that the communication, even if advocating action, might not lead to the action advocated, but also that the link between the communication and the action requires an additional act of volition on the part of the recipient of the communication.
5 9 If Clarence Brandenburg's advocacy of acts of "revengeance" against African Americans and Jews had actually inspired, produced, or caused such an act of revengeance, an intentional decision by the person committing the act would also have been necessary.
That a volitional act on the part of the recipient of a communication is necessary to convert a communication into an action reveals the importance of the role that autonomy plays in the development of a free-speech-relevant distinction between speech and action. 61 Because the gap between receiving a 59 This is most obvious with respect to advocacy, but also is applicable to praising and blaming an action, because there is still a non-necessary connection between the commendation or condemnation on the part of a communicator and the recipient of the communication adopting some attitude towards the action that is commended or condemned. communication. And thus, so it is said, any attempt on the part of government (or, for that matter, anyone else) to impede the flow of communication prerequisite to this decision would amount to a lack of respect for the recipient's autonomy. If we are not able to decide for ourselves what to do, including deciding to do or not do things for which the state will punish us if we do them, then we have lost, so the argument goes, an irreducible element of what it is to be human. And since it would not be plausible to take the value of autonomy as generating or justifying a total right (as a Hohfeldian privilege, 63 or liberty 64 ) to liberty-the right simply to do whatever one wishes-the right that autonomy generates is typically restricted to the inputs to autonomous decision-making as opposed to the outputs. 65 Freedom of communication, therefore, is said to be the freedom of a decision-maker to unimpeded access to those arguments and information necessary for her to make the best decision she can about what actually to do. Under this account, freedom of speech is in the final analysis about freedom of decision, and thus necessarily about freedom of thought.
Yet although freedom of thought certainly seems like a good thing, we need to further sharpen the inquiry. So let us begin by dividing a person's thoughts into four categories. First are thoughts as to which rightness or wrongness is beside the point, such as thinking that vanilla ice cream is better than chocolate, or thinking about any of the other topics that we tend to designate as tastes. Second are thoughts that are simply correct, such as the thoughts that skin color is irrelevant to moral worth, or that Louisville is not "persuasion principle" by reference to the importance of the autonomy of the hearer the capital of Kentucky. Third are thoughts that are actually wrong but generally harmlessly so, as with the beliefs of astrology or the beliefs in the existence of Santa Claus or the Easter Bunny. And fourth are those thoughts that are both wrong and harmful, the category about which much more now needs to be said.
We know, of course, that much of the history of the development of freedom of thought as an idea has stemmed from the frequency with which people, and especially people in power, placed in the fourth category thoughts that more appropriately belonged to the first, second, or third. We know that those in power attempted to prohibit people from denying (or, occasionally, affirming) that Catholicism represented the One True Faith; 66 tried to prohibit Copernicus and Galileo from thinking that the Earth revolved around the Sun; 67 and enacted obscenity laws in an effort to prevent people from thinking about extra-marital sex and teenage boys from thinking about sex at all.
68 Yet although such mistakes have been frequent throughout history, their frequency is a contingent empirical fact-that is, their frequency and consequences will vary with time, place, and culture. Moreover, the frequency of mistakes of this kind is still not inconsistent with the existence of the fourth category of genuinely harmful thoughts. Perhaps the frequency of mistakes, especially by the state, in distinguishing the fourth category from the other three should lead to a principle disempowering the state from drawing the distinction between harmful and harmless speech at all, but that would be a possible outcome of the analysis rather than a premise. 69 thing as a false idea," 7 he was making a (somewhat exaggerated) descriptive claim about First Amendment doctrine, and is thus most charitably understood not as asserting the implausible conceptual or meta-ethical claim that ideas do not have truth value, or that the truth-value of some ideas, even moral ones, 72 cannot be negative. Rather, Justice Powell is best understood as insisting only that the principles of First Amendment doctrine do not authorize governmental inquiry into the truth of ideas, even ideas that are plainly false.
So let us then turn to the fourth category-the category we can call harmful thoughts. 73 To put the matter directly, we want to ask whether there can be harmful thoughts, and not just whether under the First Amendment there can be harmful thoughts. Consider as an example, an example inspired by United States v. Stevens, 74 the thought that it is permissible and maybe even positively desirable for animals to be tortured for the (non-nutritional) gratification of humans. And then let us assume what I hope that most of us would acceptalthough obviously not all of us, or else Stevens would not even have arisenthat the content of the idea is not just different, and not merely a matter of taste, but simply wrong. We should hold off for a moment considering the objection that the thought will not necessarily lead to actual torture, for this is what we are about to address. But first assume simply that the activitytorturing animals for human gratification-that the thought is about is an activity that is both wrong and harmful.
Initially, we can posit that people who think that animals ought to be tortured are more likely to torture animals than people who do not have that thought. And as so put, the claim seems plainly true, even as we recognize that the percentages may be low. That is, the claim-that people who have the thought that animals ought to be tortured are more likely to torture animals than people who do not have the thought-is a claim that is consistent with many or most people who have the thought not actually committing the act. But as a matter of conditional probability, or relevance in the evidentiary sense,7
5 it would be difficult to deny that the probability of a person torturing animals is higher if the person has the thought that torturing animals is a good thing than if the same person does not have that thought. Relatedly, for most animal torturers having the thought that it would be good (or desirable, or necessary, or something of that sort) to torture this animal at this time would be a necessary condition for their engaging in the act of torture. 76 This is decidedly not to say that having the thought is a sufficient condition for a person engaging in the act. It is only to say that in the normal case having the thought is a necessary condition, in addition to it being a probabilistic indicator of undetermined size of the likelihood of animal torture.
None of this, of course, is inconsistent with there being many people (or even most people) who think that torturing animals is a good thing but who still do not torture them. Yet it seems a pretty safe empirical bet that people who do have the thought that torturing animals is a good thing are statistically more likely to torture animals than people who do not have that thought. Now let us suppose that we as a society believe, and as our laws against animal cruelty reflect, that torturing animals is wrong. And if we believe that torturing animals is wrong, then we ought to believe that the thought that torturing animals is good should be placed in the fourth category-the category of harmful thoughts. The content of the thought is wrong, the behavior that the thought is about is harmful, and the fact that people having the thought is statistically likely to increase the incidence of the harmful behavior itself 77 more animals are going to wind up being tortured when more people have the thought that torturing them is a good thing than when fewer people have that thought. The thought is a harmful thought, therefore, not simply because of its content, but because having a thought of this content will increase the likelihood of the harmful behavior. The thought that torturing animals is good therefore properly belongs in the fourth category of thoughts that are both wrong and harmful. The task before us is then to consider how we as a people and as a collective political institution should react to people who have harmful thoughts. We could (and do) respect the autonomy and their freedom to think as they wish by doing nothing-even if in an increasingly likely technological 76 I say "most" only in order to keep open the logical but empirically unlikely possibility of an instinctive or reactive act of animal torture.
77 Note that "statistically likely to increase the probability" is not the same as the behavior being likely to occur. Sending text messages while operating an automobile is statistically likely to increase the probability of accidents even though most driver texting does not produce accidents.
world we could.
78 After all, having the thought is not itself harmful, and we are now calling it a harmful thought only because the thought, harmless in itself, increases the likelihood of harmful action.
But if the possessor of harmful thoughts ought to be allowed to indulge those thoughts-to keep having them, and not to be punished for having them-because his autonomy of thinking might not (and probably will not) produce a harmful action, then, similarly, how are we to think about the full range of actions preparatory to, and probabilistically indicative of, the commission of a crime. As we know, many of these preparatory actions are designated as independent crimes-preparatory offenses.
7 9 Possession of burglar tools is an independent crime, even though the burglar tools possessor might not actually burgle anything. 80 Similarly, possession of a hand grenade is a crime although the hand grenade owner may not try to blow anyone up.81 And so too with the assault rifle owner who might not shoot anyone, 82 the pit
bull owner who would not allow his pit bulls to go unrestrained, and so on.
In cases such as the ones just listed we often criminalize the preparatory act even though the possessor or preparer in the exercise of his autonomy might not ultimately go ahead and actually do what it is we are really worried about. But in most of these cases we nevertheless do not allow respect for an agent's putative autonomy to lead us to refrain from restraining conduct (or arguing for such restraint) that is preparatory to and probabilistically related to intrinsically harmful actions. And then the question is whether these examples are any different from the example of the animal-torture thinker who might not 78 This is not an essay in neuroscience, or, more specifically, in what fMRJ scans and other techniques of modern neuroscience now or in the foreseeable future will enable people to find out about what other people are thinking. On the actual or potential application of these techniques to various legal questions, see MICHAEL S. PARDO & DENNIS PATTERSON, MINDS, BRAINS, AND LAW: THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE (2013). Nevertheless, some of these possibilities, however remote, and however large the moral issues they raise, make inquiring into the topic of freedom of thought (as opposed to the external manifestations of that thought) more important now than would have been the case a generation ago. [Vol. 65:427
actually go ahead and torture animals. If we can prosecute the burglar tools owner without a burglary actually taking place, can we prosecute the animal-torture thinker without animal torture actual taking place?
Indeed, the basic point extends beyond the narrow domain of preparatory offenses, because the universe of prohibitions broader than the evil against which they are directed is vast. In the service of the goal of reducing automobile accidents we require people to drive below a designated speed, even if in the exercise of their autonomy they might well compensate for the increased risks coming from higher speeds by driving with greater care. Nor do we permit people to possess heroin, even though it is (remotely) possible that they will neither use nor sell it. And in addition, the existence of vicarious liability in numerous domains again shows that the necessity of a mediating volitional act in order for the tort or crime to be effectuated is often thought not to preclude responsibility. That the seller of alcohol, 8 4 the seller of guns, 85 the
seller of cigarettes, or even the employer of a contract killer 87 is under some circumstances liable in addition to (and, importantly, not instead of, showing that even the existence of a legally responsible volitional intermediary does not preclude vicarious liability) the principal shows once again that respect for autonomy is rarely understood to generate doctrines immunizing anyone other than the final agent from liability. The entire domain of vicarious liability, as well as tort liability for foreseeable misuse, 88 all reject the notion that the existence of an autonomous agent whose autonomous decision causes a harm will serve to immunize from liability those other agents whose actions might have contributed to the autonomous agent's harmful acts.
Although the examples that undercut the argument from autonomy thus exist even outside the realm of preparatory offenses, let us stay on the safest ground by considering only the category of harmful preparatory acts. As just noted, such acts, with little controversy, are routinely and generally both criminalized and taken to provide the basis for tort liability. It turns out, therefore, that there is no general existing legal principle immunizing intrinsically harmless acts from legal sanction if they are probabilistically related to actual harmful acts. And because we have seen that we can characterize harmful thoughts in much the same way, the question of how to conceive of harmful thoughts is importantly similar to the question of how to conceive of harmful preparatory acts.
Identifying the similarity between harmful thoughts and harmful preparatory acts enables us to sharpen the inquiry even further. Let us say that having thought T increases the probability of harm H(1) with a probability of P (1), and thus that the expected harm-EH(1)-is P(1) x H(1). But the same structure applies to acts as well, so that we can also say that engaging in action A (buying or possessing burglar tools, say) increases the probability of harm H(2) by P(2), and thus that the expected harm-EH(2)-is P(2) x H(2). The important question, therefore, is whether we should treat EH(1) differentlyless restrictively-from how we would (and do) treat EH(2), when their values are equivalent, or when EH(1) is greater than EH(2). To put it differently, should we immunize harm-producing thoughts from restriction more than we immunize harm-producing actions when the expected harms are the same, or when the expected harms of the thought are greater than the expected harms of the action. In other words, should there be a principle of freedom of thought?
The alert reader will have noticed that I have just translated into freedom of thought terms the same formulation that Scanlon and others 89 have used to characterize a free speech principle. If a principle of freedom of speech just means that speech enjoys a degree of immunity from government action greater than that possessed by non-speech action having the same or equivalent negative consequences, then a principle of freedom of thought must similarly mean that thoughts have a degree of immunity from government action greater than that enjoyed by non-thought conduct again having the same or equivalent negative consequences. But if this is what a robust or genuine principle of freedom of thought must mean, we still must address whether as a normative matter such a principle ought to be accepted.
9°I
n addressing the question whether there should be a principle immunizing harmful thoughts in a way that harmful preparatory acts having equivalent expected harm are not immunized, it is necessary to return to the argument from autonomy.
91 It seems initially obvious that respect for someone's autonomy requires that we respect her thought processes.
92 But then we must still ask why we should respect someone's right (and the existence of a right in the sense explicated in Part I above is what is now under consideration) to have a wrong and harmful thought?
One reason for respecting what appear to be harmful thoughts is the possibility that the possessor of the thought is right, that we (or the state) are wrong, and that consequently the thought is not in fact harmful. This Millian perspective-it was John Stuart Mill who most famously connected the liberty of (expressed) opinion to epistemic fallibilism and thus to the possibility that the received opinion is mistaken and the suppressed opinion correct 93 -is certainly a wise caution before acting on any received belief and before restricting any action thought harmful.
Although humility is almost always wise, it is not yet apparent that a principle of humility can generate the differential principle we are seeking. For although I might be wrong in thinking that that you are wrong in what you are thinking, I might also be wrong in thinking that you are wrong in what you are doing. Humility is in general a good thing, yet it is far from clear that there is reason to believe that my (over)confidence about my assessment of your thoughts ought to be tempered by a stronger principle of humility than that which should properly temper my assessment of your actions, especially your preparatory actions. Yes, I might be wrong, but it is hard to see why that 90 1 again bracket the question of the physical inevitability of freedom of thought, in part because the physical inevitability captured by the concentration camp slogan, "Die Gedanken sind frei," may in our modern neuroscientific world no longer be so inevitable. possibility should be any less applicable to my empirical probabilistic assessments of the consequences of your preparatory or other accessory actions than it is to my empirical probabilistic assessment of the consequences of your thoughts.
94
Of course we know, as discussed above, 95 that thoughts might well not produce actions. But this rejoinder is unavailing. It is true that thoughts might not produce actions consistent with those thoughts, but harmless (as stipulated) actions that are probabilistically causally related to harmful actions might also not produce those harmful actions. If respect for some agent's ability to change her mind before committing an actually harmful act leads to a principle of moral, constitutional, or legal protection, then it ought logically to lead to a principle protecting harmless acts just as it protects harmless thoughts. Or, to be more precise, there remains no reason to reject a principle protecting acts whose expected harm is no greater than the expected harm of what we have been calling a harmful thought.
Even more importantly, it is not clear whether the idea of autonomy can do the work that many theorists appear to be requiring of it.
96 Consider, for example, the 1964 incident involving Kitty Genovese, who was brutally attacked and murdered while multiple onlookers allegedly did nothing at all.
97
Now one (deliberately offensive and tendentious) way of describing the behavior of the non-intervening onlookers is as respecting the autonomy of the attacker. But of course this characterization is absurd, and it is absurd precisely because we take the principle of autonomy to be limited by, or to exclude, an agent's autonomous decision to harm others. My freedom to swing my arm ends at the tip of your nose, as it is said.
98 And once we see this, we can understand that autonomy is in an important way asymmetric. Once we engage in the discounting commended by the principle of humility, we have no reason 94 See Scanlon, Comment on Baker's Autonomy and Free Speech, supra note 3, at 322 n. 1 (noting with respect to autonomy that the "same is true of paternalistic legislation restricting behavior other than expression"). to respect a person's autonomous other-regarding and harm-producing actions, even as she, presumably (or hopefully) applying the same principle of humility to discount her own assessment of her own proposed action, preserves her obligation to do what she thinks best. Just as you have an obligation to do what you think it is best to do, so too do I have an obligation to try to keep you from doing so when my assessment is that what you think it is best to do will be both other-regarding and harm-producing.
99
The foregoing argument does not work, of course, for any instance in which a preparatory thought has a lower expected harm than a preparatory action. But we have stipulated an equivalence, and with that stipulation in place the asymmetry of autonomy-your obligation to follow your autonomy where it leads on the basis of your best judgment that it is for the good does not entail my obligation to refrain from attempting to limit that autonomy when in my best judgment your (mistaken) exercise of your (mistaken) best judgment will produce harm to third parties 00 -produces the conclusion that a principle of autonomy cannot generate a distinct principle of freedom of thought. Of course the stipulation of equivalence may be empirically unsound, and the class of harmful thoughts (a more plausible way of understanding the issue as opposed to making these assessments in each individual case) may be a class less harmful, in the expected harm sense, than the class of harmful preparatory actions. Accordingly, we need to relax the stipulation of equivalence and take this possibility seriously. But before doing so, it will be important to shift the analysis from freedom of thought to freedom of speech.
IV. FROM THOUGHTS TO SPEECH
I have up to now framed the issue in terms of freedom of thought rather than freedom of speech. And there are two reasons for this: First, freedom of thought appears to have an even tighter connection to autonomy than does freedom of speech. What, after all, is more mine than my thoughts? Second, and partly as a consequence of the first reason, the argument for there being no principle of freedom of thought appears initially to be even stronger than the argument for there being no principle of freedom of speech. 530, 553 (1999) .
100 And if we reject anti-paternalism as a distinct principle, the same argument applies to harms to the agent herself For a forceful and recent rejection of anti-paternalism, see SARAH CoNLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING COERCIVE PATERNALISM (2013). more difficult argument against a free thought principle is sound, then so too, alikely to increase the incidence of genuinely harmful actions. And we can examine this speech in the same way that we have examined freedom of thought. 1 06 Thus, if we assume equivalent causal contributions to some harmful consequence by some act of speech and by some act of non-speech action, or if we simply assume equivalent expected harm, is there any reason to immunize preparatory speech acts to a greater extent than we immunize preparatory non-speech conduct? There may be, but, as we have just seen, if there is such a reason, it is a not a reason that can be derived from conceptions of autonomy.
1 0 7 If the principle of autonomy protects neither autonomous harm-producing actions nor the actions that would increase the likelihood of subsequent and consequent harm, then there seems no reason, just as in the case of thoughts whose consequences have the same structure, to treat speech differently from the way in which we treat action.
At this point it is necessary to return to Emerson. Once we understand that intrinsically harmless preparatory actions are routinely prohibited when they are probabilistically related to harmful acts, even though a volitional act is necessary to link the harmless act to the harmful one, 1°8 the existence of such a volitional link can no longer constitute a sound basis for distinguishing speech from action. Rather, the case for speech being relevantly different from action would have to rest on the determination that the category of speech that is causally productive of harmful action is, as a category, less efficacious than is the category of harmless actions that are causally productive of harmful actions.
Although Emerson and others have simply asserted this to be the case, 1 0 9 it turns out that this is a virtually impossible proposition to establish. Once we understand that the relevant companison is not between speech and harmful actions but rather between speech and those actions, not harmful in themselves, that might produce harmful actions, then the existence of a free speech principle that would immunize the former but not the latter from control must rest on this extremely problematic empirical claim. We could of course say that under circumstances of empirical uncertainty the default rule ought to be freedom, but we could say this about action as easily as about speech. And thus the putative default rule would still not provide a sound basis for the distinction between speech and action or for an autonomy-based principle of freedom of speech. This approach may be effective as a matter of existing positive law, but as a matter of pre-positive-law analysis we appear to be left with the view that any autonomy-based or individualistic conception of freedom of speech rests far more on an unestablished and likely false conclusion about the harmlessness of speech than is typically recognized.
To be more specific, if the claim that speech is harmless rests on its inability to be causally related to intrinsically harmful acts, then we have far too many counter-examples in our experience to be comfortable with this formulation."l 0 But if the claim instead rests on the view that any harm that is (probabilistically) caused by a communicative act requires the mediation of any additional volitional act on the part of the recipient of the communication, then accepting this conception of harmlessness would unsettle far more of existing tort and other non-speech law than we have previously thought. And with both of these alternatives aside, therefore, what remains is a view of speech that maintains that speech, as a category, is differentially harmless, a view that is in need of far more empirical evidence than it has thus far received. It is of course true that most speech is harmless. But it is also true that most action is harmless. Recognizing this seemingly obvious but often ignored fact has led many people to make claims about the categorial or differential harmlessness of speech"' that may not stand up to close analysis or empirical testing.
Because it is true both that most speech will not produce harmful action and that most action will not produce harmful action, the question before us is not whether a society should permit the regulation of harmless speech. Rather, it is the question whether the proper line between permissible and impermissible state intervention is a line between speech and action, or instead, and seemingly preferably, between causally inert (of harm) behavior, some of which is speech and some of which is action, and causally efficacious (of harm) behavior, some of which is speech and some of which is action. Under the latter principle, some speech now protected under existing First Amendment doctrine would be regulable, but if applied accurately the differences between this principle and existing doctrine might well be small. Under non-ideal conditions the difference might of course be greater, but the question then is still whether guarding against the consequences of non-ideal 110 See, e.g., supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
111 Seesupra note 50.
[Vol. 65:427application should be a strategy limited to speech or rather one of more pervasive application.
CONCLUSION
The basic idea of this Article is that it is hardly clear that respect for an agent's autonomy ought to lead other agents, or the state, to tolerate autonomous communicative actions that are determined to be likely to cause harm to third parties any more than they should tolerate autonomous noncommunicative actions whose consequences are equivalent. If the principle of freedom to engage in autonomous actions is one that is limited to cases of harm to others, then, at the very least, this limitation has more impact on standard autonomy views about freedom of speech than has commonly been appreciated. If there is a reason to protect autonomous speech that does not apply as well to autonomous action, then, as we have seen, it cannot be a reason derived from the idea of autonomy itself, and instead needs to be based on a much greater empirical showing of the differential consequences of speech and action than has to date been provided.
All of this might be irrelevant to the very existence of a free speech principle if it turns out that speech, or a subset of speech, or, most accurately, a subset of communication, has as a category positive attributes not possessed by the category of non-speech action. And thus even if the harm-producing capacities of the two categories were equivalent, differential benefit-producing capacities might still be sufficient to justify a sound free speech principle. And although dealing with that possibility must remain for another day, the analysis here may suggest that even that task-and thus the task of distinguishing speech from action for purposes of explaining, say, the value of speech in the search for truth"l 2 is considerably more difficult than has traditionally been assumed. 113 In addition, this Article is situated almost entirely within the domain of individualistic or autonomy-based accounts of freedom of speech rather than democracy-based accounts. Some of the latter are about the methods of 112 For a collection of the most important works in the "search for truth" or "marketplace of ideas" free speech tradition, see VINCENT BLASI, IDEAS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 318-689 (2d ed. 2012). democratic deliberation and decision-making," l4 and some are based on the importance in a democracy of using speech and the press as checks on the possibility of governmental overreaching or other abuse of power. 11 5 But what most species of democracy-based accounts of free speech share is a nonreliance on the distinction between speech and action 1 16 that is so central to individualistic or autonomy-based accounts, whether they be based on listenerautonomy or speaker-autonomy or both. Listeners may secure information valuable to their autonomy in countless ways, only some of which are based on the propositions uttered by others. And speakers may embody their autonomy also in countless ways, only some of which involve speaking in even the broadest sense. There may be good historical reasons for carving out speech from these broader categories, but if we set aside the history and the existing legal or constitutional doctrine, we will discover that the non-historical reasons for doing so-for distinguishing speech from action-do not stand up to close analytic scrutiny.
